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Caging the Wolf: Seeking a Constitutional
Home for the Independent Counsel
Rebecca L. Brownt
Justice Scalia was still wrong in Morrison v. Olson.' Pro-
fessor Kelley has shown us that there may be some empirical
force in Justice Scalia's belief that there is no such thing as "a
little" executive power. He has confirmed for us the absolutely
lupine nature of the "wolf' who, true to Justice Scalia's insight,
comes, after all, as a wolf.2 But to draw from this a conclusion
that any restriction on the President's power to control the ex-
ecutive branch is unconstitutional-as both Professor Kelley
and Justice Scalia would do-in my view goes too far. The
right analysis will depend on what structures have been put in
place to compensate for that diminution in presidential control.
It is necessary to consider the independent counsel under
structural constitutional principles that have prevailed in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence for decades. Neither Professor
Kelley nor Justice Scalia has attempted to do so.
Our government was designed to survive irrespective of
which individuals might happen to hold the various official po-
sitions at any moment in history. The constitutional govern-
ment would not depend for its continued viability on the good
faith, good judgment, or good heart of any actor. Instead, the
framers assumed the worst and set up a system in which ambi-
tion would counteract ambition.3 The engine of constitutional
government would run on the fuel of human frailty as well as
strength. It would do so by a careful design of institutional
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Lisa Bressman,
Barry Friedman, John Goldberg, Bob Rasmussen and Nick Zeppos for their
help in developing this Comment.
1. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
2. See id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Frequently an issue of this sort
will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing .... But this
wolf comes as a wolf.").




structures and process.4 What Professor Kelley's enlightening
illustrations demonstrate implicitly is that the majority of the
Court in Morrison lost sight of this deep-rooted constitutional
tenet in its apparent confidence that good judgment would pre-
vail despite a shaky structural blueprint for the independent
counsel edifice. That mistake was not only factually unsup-
ported, but it was out of step with the driving vision underlying
the constitutional structure: the framers knew, and it took only
ten years for the Supreme Court to find out in spades, that any
political structure that relies on self-restraint of political actors
is a threat to the bedrock values of constitutionalism-includ-
ing the protection of individual rights through procedural limi-
tation on power.
Professor Kelley's paper very informatively demonstrates,
using the most compelling of examples from current history,
how badly the Court anticipated the way that this statute
would corrode executive branch decisionmaking. These exam-
ples, indeed, lend support to a suggestion that perhaps the Su-
preme Court should be more reluctant to resolve facial constitu-
tional attacks without a well-developed record demonstrating
the actual impact of the statute in question-a suggestion
squarely at odds with Justice Scalia's formalist approach,
which needs no empirical embellishment on its starkly theo-
retical conclusions. Had the Supreme Court waited to decide
the case until it had a full record showing the effect of the in-
dependent counsel statute on the actual litigation and law-
execution decisions described in Professor Kelley's paper, it
would have been hard-pressed to conclude, as it in fact did con-
clude in Morrison v. Olson under its functional inquiry, that
the "Act give[s] the Executive Branch sufficient control over
the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to
perform his constitutionally assigned duties."s But even that
approach, although less formalistic than Justice Scalia's, asks
the wrong question. Both fail to ask whether the values gener-
ally served by the observance of structural norms-principal
among which is individual liberty-are protected in some other
4. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) ("The Framers recog-
nized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power
were critical to preserving liberty.").
5. 487 U.S. at 696; see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("[Ihe proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which [the
challenged action] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its con-
stitutionally assigned functions.").
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way such that deviation from those norms can be tolerated
consistent with constitutional principle.6
A better question for the Court to have pondered is how a
concept like the independent counsel scheme can be under-
stood within the constitutional framework that we have. Here,
reasoning by analogy is both appropriate and helpful, because
the Court has considered variations on the theme of legislative
limitations on executive control in other contexts in which the
underlying concerns were (arguably) similar.! Two existing
models in particular provide analogical insight into an intelli-
gible classification for the independent counsel statute or some
similar scheme within the constitutional structure: the model
of the legislative office and the model of the independent
agency.
I. THE ANALOGY OF THE LEGISLATIVE OFFICE
The first analogy looks at a different legislative construct,
the congressional support agency. By this I mean some sort of
administrative body established by Congress to assist it in the
exercise of its own constitutional functions.8 The General Ac-
counting Office may be understood to follow this model, as the
court recognized in Bowsher v. Synar,9 and so may the Con-
gressional Research Service.'0
These agencies have been assumed to be constitutional for
a few interrelated reasons. First, their heads are not "Officers
of the United States"-either superior or inferior-within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause,' and therefore members
of Congress are free to appoint them. 2 Second, they possess no
6. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1513 (1991) (advocating explicit consideration of consequences for
individual rights in separation of powers controversies).
7. For a theoretical exploration and defense of the approach, see Cass R.
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
8. See MICHAEL FOLEY & JOHN E. OWENS, CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENCY: INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 391 (1996)
(describing the General Accounting Office, Congressional Research Service,
Congressional Budget Office, and Office of Technology Assessment, all within
the legislative branch).
9. 478 U.S. 714, 728-31 (1986).
10. See 2 U.S.C. § 166 (1994) (establishing the Congressional Research
Service to respond to congressional research requests).
11. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
12. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-19 (1976) (stating that Congress
may not appoint "Officers of the United States").
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power to "alter[ ] the legal rights, duties, and relations of per-
sons ... outside the Legislative Branch"; Congress may not
delegate such power to a subset of itself. 3 Third, they possess
no power to execute the laws of the United States. 14 As long as
these limitations are observed, congressional agencies can
function to assist the Congress in carrying out its own constitu-
tionally assigned duties.
Viewed through this lens, an independent counsel statute
could, in effect, create an administrative body, headed by an
independent counsel, to carry into effect the congressional
power of impeachment under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 15 It is clear, of course, that the current independent
counsel statute does not fit within this model. As currently
drafted, it fails in several material respects to meet the struc-
tural limitations necessary to constrain it. There is no consti-
tutional prohibition, however, against Congress's establish-
ment of such an office, provided that the constitutional
strictures applicable to those offices are complied with.
As an initial matter, the funding for such an office must
come from Congress's budget, not from the executive branch
budget.16 The current independent counsel statute provides for
virtually unlimited funding out of the Justice Department
budget.17 This alone destroys any claim that the office does not
possess executive affiliation and is merely an arm of Congress.
There is more than merely technical value in such a limitation.
The need to fund-that is, both to internalize costs with their
inevitable policy tradeoffs and to account publicly for their
payment-is an important check on use and abuse of power in
a democracy. Congress well knows that if it spends too much
on its internal support, questions will be raised in the political
arena about the justifications for such expenditures. There-
13. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
14. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 726.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, c. 18; see McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135, 177-78 (1927) (recognizing the validity of congressional investigation in
aid of legislative power).
16. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 727-32 (examining various facets of
the office of the Comptroller General as provided by statute, discussed in con-
gressional documents, and described in opinions of the Comptroller General).
Although the opinion in Bowsher does not explicitly mention the funding of
the office, it is quite clear by implication that any feature of an office which
had an effect on its fimctions, including funding, would be a factor in identi-
fying which branch should be understood as housing that particular office.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(2) (1994).
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fore, an impeachment-based agency located in the legislative
branch would place the costs for such services where they be-
long, that is in the branch seeking a basis to exercise its power
to impeach and justifying that quest to its constituency. 18 The
principle of accountability, as well as that of incentive struc-
tures, is assisted tremendously by a rule that places the costs
of an activity in the branch that seeks the benefits of that ac-
tivity.
A second limitation on any independent counsel office
housed in the legislative branch is that, consistent with Bow-
sher v. Synar, it could not execute criminal laws. Its sole
sphere of authority would be to investigate possible bases for
impeachment, but solely in the political, rather than the crimi-
nal (i.e. executive), arena.19 Its sole means of punishment
would be to recommend removal of the target of its scrutiny
from office. Thus, concerns over the protection of individual
rights, particularly acute in matters of criminal law enforce-
ment, are automatically mitigated to some degree.20
The agency also would face the limitations imposed on
congressional committees and subcommittees. This agency
could investigate for the purpose of contributing to a congres-
sional inquiry, including exercising the power to issue the
types of subpoenas that the Congress itself has the power to is-
18. Of course, Congress theoretically sets the policy objectives for the ex-
ecutive branch as well in its exercise of the power of the purse. But account-
ability lies in the spending as well as in the appropriating of funds. See
FOLEY & OWENS, supra note 8, at 388-89. The Foley & Owens book discusses
the debate in the 1970s between advocates of a new formulation of executive
hegemony-which placed responsibility for policy administration squarely
within the executive-and the proponents of congressional control of the pro-
gram, who pushed through various measures designed to control policy-
making in spending, including the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974.
19. Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1953) (holding that
authorizing resolution for congressional committee's investigation limits scope
of committee's powers, but perhaps influenced by the fact that the case in-
volved conduct arguably protected by the First Amendment); see also Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959) (stating that the committee
must act with valid "legislative purpose" in its investigative activities); Wat-
kins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
20. Cf. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 208-09 (holding that due process protections
and principles of fundamental fairness apply to witnesses subpoenaed by a
congressional committee); see also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 123-
24 (1963) (congressional committee must follow its own published rules when




sue, but would remain subject to the checks that the Supreme
Court has established to protect the due process and other con-
stitutional interests of witnesses called to present evidence be-
fore congressional committees and subjected to the threat of
statutory contempt proceedings against them for failure to
comply. The Supreme Court has made clear that targets of ac-
tion by congressional committees are entitled to due process
protections, including fundamental fairness, notice, entitle-
ment to rely on the committee's adherence to its own published
rules, and the protection of certain common-law privileges.21
Presumably any institutional limitations imposed on a commit-
tee or subcommittee of Congress would also apply to an office
established for the support of Congress within the legislative
branch-because in both cases the delegate of power is acting
as an agent of Congress without the full-blown procedural obli-
gations that attend the bicameral passage of law.22
It is apparent that if Congress's principal motivation in
passing an independent counsel law is to assist itself in its
oversight of the executive branch with an eye toward possible
impeachments, it has a constitutionally viable way to carry
this into effect. The nature of the office would naturally curb
somewhat the risk of aggrandizement of power generally and
violations of individual rights specifically, because of the defi-
nitional limitations that must exist (under existing precedent)
once one understands the actor as an agent of the legislative
branch. Thus, an understanding of the functional home of this
government actor clarifies the limits that must constrain him
or her in the exercise of the delegated power, in this case the
power to facilitate an impeachment, and thereby ensures the
preservation of structural values.
In sum, the separation of powers demands that this legis-
lative agent not also employ the vast enforcement powers that
are available to employees of the executive branch, particularly
in criminal matters. The combination of legislative power with
enforcement power constitutes a very grave affront to the sepa-
ration of powers, and if carried out in the prosecution of a
criminal case, presents the even stronger constitutional objec-
tion of threatening individual liberty under procedures that
themselves are in contravention of constitutional norms. Obvi-
21. See JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 241-50 (1976) (citing cases).
22. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
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ously, therefore, the institution established this way could not
serve as a basis for a power to convene grand juries, issue in-
dictments, enter into plea bargains, or prosecute federal
crimes. These not only flout the Bowsher v. Synar proscription
of a legislative agent's exercise of executive power but also
violate the requirement that congressional investigations rest
on a "valid legislative purpose,"23 which of course does not in-
clude prosecution of statutory crimes.
H. THE ANALOGY OF TE INDEPENDENT AGENCY
A second way to understand a possible independent coun-
sel scheme uses the model of the independent agency. Indeed,
the independent counsel statute invites a comparison to the
independent agency in various ways, including the motivation
behind enactment of the law. Like the independent counsel
law, the independent agency originated as an effort to remove
certain types of execution of law from the political control of
the President. In the case of agencies, the goal of placing cer-
tain policy initiatives outside the direct control of the President
was to provide expertise and judgment on important policy
matters.24 In the case of the independent counsel statute, the
goal of insulating the counsel from presidential control in in-
vestigations involving high-level executive branch officials was
to alleviate conflict of interest.25 Unlike the relatively new in-
dependent counsel structure, however, the independent agency
has been the subject of over a half-century of academic debate,
judicial scrutiny and constitutional discourse. That debate can
be useful in helping to place the independent counsel into an
intelligible framework for analogical constitutional analysis.
23. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. According to Watkins, the investigative
power:
encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys
of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of
enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, ineffi-
ciency or waste.
Id.
24. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 547 (1998) (discussing purposes of early agencies).
25. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-452, at 37 (1987) (stating that the good
cause removal provision "protect[s] the independent counsel's ability to act
independently of the President's direct control).
12751999]
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The courts have long recognized, both explicitly and im-
plicitly, that independent agencies stand on shaky constitu-
tional ground.26 That is not to say that they are unconstitu-
tional, but just that they are clearly a structural departure
from the norms established in the Constitution, and conse-
quently give rise to serious questions about their legitimacy
and a need for caution in their oversight.27 The Supreme Court
has greeted these concerns with some important responses.
The overarching theme of the Court's jurisprudence on the
subject of independent agencies is the continued vigilance to
ensure that departures from structural constitutional norms
are compensated for by the addition of supplementary proce-
dural protections for individual rights.28 Knowing that an
overriding purpose of the system of separated powers was the
protection of individual liberties,29 the Court has at times
shown a willingness to tolerate innovations in structure when
it could be assured that those innovations would not result in a
threat to the interests generally protected under the rubric of
the Due Process Clause. Reverting to elementary administra-
tive law principles, we see that the price of delegating power
outside of the conventional tripartite structure of the federal
government has consistently been the assurance of heightened
concern for the consequences to affected individuals.
26. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412-13
(1928) (upholding statute delegating legislative power on the theory that the
Congress is better suited to know when it needs to rely on the executive
branch than the Court is, and this was a minor delegation); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 58-67 (discussing constitutional
attacks on independent agencies); cf. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
255 U.S. 81, 87, 92 (1921) (striking down criminal statute on ground that it
delegated legislative power in contravention of the separation of powers).
27. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99-134 (1993) (dis-
cussing constitutional and policy problems of delegation).
28. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (stating that
agency's commingling of functions may not interfere with the right to a "fair
trial in a fair tribunal"); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.15, at 208 (2d ed. 1978) (stating that nondelegation doctrine
should be designed "to protect private parties against injustice on account of
unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power"); Brown, supra note 6, at
1554-56 (discussing correlation between delegation issues and due process
concerns).
29. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory,-
8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 196, 205 (1991) (suggesting that government arrange-
ments should be examined to determine effect on personal liberties).
[Vol. 83:12691276
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To begin with, the existence of judicial review of an inde-
pendent agency's exercise of delegated power has always been
critical to its legitinacy.30 Although there has been no express
holding to the effect that judicial review is constitutionally
compelled with regard to administrative power, "[a] key feature
in many modern discussions about administrative law and ju-
dicial review is the claim, sometimes tacit and other times ex-
press, that judicial review is a constitutional imperative."3' A
source for this argument is Crowell v. Benson, in which the
Court, in effect, offered the quid pro quo of de novo review by
Article IH courts in exchange for participation of agencies in
important private rights cases.32 But even more important
than the quid pro quo argument is the rationale that a delega-
tion of power implies some limit; that the availability of judi-
cial review is a necessary tool for the enforcement of any such
limit; and generally that judicial review is an important guard
against arbitrary action.33
When Congress delegates authority to agencies, courts
must guard against the evils of "unlimited power,"34 "unfet-
tered discretion,"35 and, particularly, "the danger of overbroad,
unauthorized, and arbitrary application of criminal sanc-
tions."36 To this end, in reviewing delegations of legislative
power, the Court has required that Congress provide "an intel-
ligible principle" to which the delegate is directed to conform. 37
30. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
320 (1965).
31. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Under-
pinnings of Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159,
1170 (1997).
32. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 925 (1988).
33. See JAFFE, supra note 30, at 321; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (1963):
The principle that authority granted by the legislature must be lim-
ited by adequate standards serves two primary functions vital to pre-
serving the separation of powers required by the Constitution....
Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise
at large by providing the courts with some measure against which tojudge the official action that has been challenged.
34. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 285 (1933).
35. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431 (1935).
36. Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 353
(1974) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ro-
bel, 389 U.S. 258, 272 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
37. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928);
1999] 1277
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This requirement has served-or failed to serve, in the view of
some38-the constitutional values, otherwise endangered or
lost in the process of delegation, of democratic accountability
and protection of liberty.39
Procedural due process has been a related outgrowth of the
Court's jurisprudence regarding independent agencies. Agen-
cies with the power to harm important interests of individuals
must conform to minimal procedural requirements to ensure
both accuracy and fairness in this meting out of government
power. Procedural protections are especially important in the
arena of delegated power because the institutional procedures
applicable to the three branches of government when they are
acting in their pure capacities, neither giving nor receiving
delegations of power, are unavailable to check the exercise of
delegated authority. For example, when Congress acts legisla-
tively in a manner that affects people generally, any procedural
entitlements that may be due an affected individual have been
satisfied by the compliance with standard legislative proce-
dures.40 When an agency acts in its place, however, individuals
affected by the measure have been accorded greater rights of
participation and judicial review.
It is clear-and I believe uncontroversial-from this line of
cases that, if a delegation of power is valid at all, it must carry
accompanying assurances that the delegated power will be ex-
ercised within constraints subject to enforcement. So far, I
have been talking only about delegations of legislative power
by Congress to an independent agency. Delegations of judicial
and executive power carry similar restrictions. 41 For example,
see Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989) ("[S]o long
as Congress provides an administrative agency with standards guiding its ac-
tions such that a court could 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed,' no delegation of legislative authority trenching on the principle of
separation of powers has occurred.").
38. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 27, at 158.
39. See id.; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-26 (1944).
40. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915).
41. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410-11 (1989) (holding
that the President's limited removal authority over Article III judges serving
on a sentencing commission is not a violation of separation of powers because
it does not threaten the judges' function of deciding cases fairly and impar-
tially); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
84-87 (1982) (deciding that the possibility of congressional control over bank-
ruptcy judges, empowered to adjudicate private rights but not afforded the
independence provided Article HI judges, rendered the Bankruptcy Act of
1278 [Vol. 83:1269
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agencies (even when acting in a prosecutorial or adjudicatory,
rather than regulatory, capacity) may not enforce their own
money awards or their own subpoenas, and may not exercise
contempt power. 42 In addition, out of concern for the constitu-
tional rights of a criminally accused, agencies may not exercise
criminal jurisdiction in promulgating or enforcing criminal
penalties. 43
The independent counsel statute can be seen as nothing
more than a delegation of power. Granted, it is not a delega-
tion of Congress's own power by Congress, but rather is a dele-
gation of executive power by Congress to an individual not a
full-fledged member of the executive branch, in a manner de-
signed to limit the President's participation in certain execu-
tive matters. One could argue, as Justice Scalia and others
have done, that that is all one needs to know to conclude that
such an effort is simply, flatly, patently unconstitutional for
reasons having to do with a unitary theory of executive
power." But for me, such flat-out generalities about the formal
requirements of the Constitution do not answer the question-
particularly since they also result in striking down delegations
to independent agencies and thus require overruling sixty
years of Supreme Court precedent. 45 The more useful question
is whether, given that it is not necessarily unconstitutional for
Congress to limit the President's control over the exercise of
1978 unconstitutional).
42. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.24 (2d ed. 1983).
43. See id. § 2.22.
44. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733-34 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia demands, rhetorically and sardonically:
Is it conceivable that if Congress passed a statute depriving itself of
less than full and entire control over some insignificant area of legis-
lation, we would inquire whether the matter was "so central to the
functioning of the Legislative Branch" as really to require complete
control, or whether the statute gives Congress "sufficient control over
the surrogate legislator to ensure that Congress is able to perform its
constitutionally assigned duties"? Of course we would have none of
that.
Id. at 709-10. I believe he answers his own question incorrectly- that is very
close to what the Court does when it applies the so-called "nondelegation doc-
trine."
45. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 n.4 (1986) (taking pains to
deny "that an affirmance in this case requires casting doubt on the status of
'independent' agencies because no issues involving such agencies are pre-
sented here"). It is clear, however, that had the Court struck down the stat-
ute on the theory that all exercises of executive power must be under the con-
trol of the President-the unitary executive theory-such an affirmance would
indeed undermine the constitutional status of the independent agencies.
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executive power in certain circumstances, Congress has ad-
hered closely enough in this case to general principles of dele-
gation to survive constitutional attack.46 More specifically, has
Congress in this delegation paid enough attention to the pro-
tection of individual rights and avoidance of unfettered discre-
tion? I think that question is quite easily answered "no," for
several reasons.
Congress has not provided this independent body with an
"intelligible principle" that would guide and limit its discretion
so as to avoid the risk of unfettered authority. Even if it is not
the case that presidential control over executive officers is re-
quired as a matter of Article II jurisprudence, as the unitary
executive theorists contend, it is still the case that delegated
power must have some structural limits. If not the account-
ability provided in Article II, then at least the intelligible prin-
ciple applicable to independent agencies. To be fair, Congress
seemed intuitively to recognize this when it provided in the Act
that "[an independent counsel shall, except to the extent that
to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chap-
ter, comply with the written or other established policies of the
Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal
laws."47 In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court relied on this
provision as one means to ensure that the independent counsel
would not undermine the powers of the executive branch.48 Al-
though, in my view, the Court asked the wrong question by in-
quiring about encroachment into executive branch function for
its own sake instead of looking for structural threats to indi-
vidual rights, it still correctly noted the importance of limita-
tion on the discretion of the independent counsel.
When viewed as the "intelligible principle" required for
constitutional reasons as a price for investing actors outside
the tripartite structure with significant government power,
46. If anything, the Court is showing a new willingness to be critical of
delegations. In Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), the ma-jority struck down the Line Item Veto Act as an unconstitutional authority for
the President to "repeal" legislation, rejecting the dissenters' characterization
of the Act as a delegation to the President of "a contingent power to deny ef-
fect to certain statutory language." The dissent invoked the "intelligible prin-
ciple" test in arguing that the delegation was valid. Id. at 2125-28 (Breyer, J.,
with O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). Whether the victory of the major-
ity in that case signals a new hostility to delegations in general remains to be
seen.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1994).
48. 487 U.S. at 696.
1280 [Vol. 83:1269
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however, this statutory provision falls short. First, it contains
its own escape clause, "except where not possible." Second, it is
not enforceable in court, which is the essential mechanism for
enforcing the intelligible principle requirement. Without judi-
cial review, the intelligible principle (if any) must rely on vol-
untary compliance for effect-hardly a forceful structural
guarantee. Predictably, the Office of the Independent Counsel
has taken the position that it is not, in fact, bound by Justice
Department guidelines because no one can force the issue.
Third, it is not clear that prosecutorial guidelines provide
enough limitation on discretion anyway because they are de-
veloped for another purpose, in the context of providing guid-
ance, rather than restraint, to a prosecutorial department that
is constructed very differently and with very different sets of
motivations and structural limitations. It may be that another
set of criteria would be needed to avoid the uncontrolled exer-
cise of government power in this case.
A related way in which the independent counsel scheme
falls short of constitutional standards for delegation concerns
the lack of any meaningful judicial review as a means of di-
rectly protecting individual rights. An ordinary target of
criminal law enforcement scrutiny has protections that the
targets of the independent counsel scheme do not have, such as
the political accountability of the people bringing the charges
against them, arguments to be made before a judge alleging
prosecutorial vindictiveness, and protection against selective
prosecution. As a practical matter the types of officials who are
potential targets of independent counsel scrutiny are unable
for political reasons to rely on many of the standard protections
that the more anonymous criminal suspect may use, such as
the Fifth Amendment and other privileges. The problem with
the statute as it is written is that it does not define the limits
of prosecutorial behavior, and thus leaves no opportunity for a
target or a court to conclude that appropriate bounds have
been transgressed. (Of course, this is just what it means to
lack an intelligible principle here.) Even when the bounds are
constitutional in nature, the highly-charged atmosphere in in-
dependent counsel investigations may mean that important in-
stitutional interests cannot or will not be asserted by the af-
fected individuals. However, because this issue involves the
full panoply of criminal powers and potential punishments,
there is no reason to believe that basic civil liberties can be
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dispensed with simply because the targets are a statutorily
limited class of high-level government officials.
In sum, the statute lacks any meaningful intelligible prin-
ciple, and the consequences are felt directly on individual
rights. Although the Court has not rigidly policed the intelligi-
ble principle requirement, it has required something. Moreo-
ver, it has sought to compensate for any substantive weak-
nesses by requiring stringent procedural protections. Thus,
the body of law governing agency behavior provides an impor-
tant basic insight: if the structure of an institution is constitu-
tionally weak, look to procedural protections to compensate for
that weakness. This effort may not succeed in overcoming
structural defects in all cases, of course, but it is at least theminimum effort that must be made. No such effort is evident
in the independent counsel statute. Targets of independent
counsel investigations are not even mentioned in the statute
except to identify who they may be. All procedural provisions
in the statute relate to the rights of the independent counsel,
the Attorney General or the Special Division. A statute that
would pass constitutional scrutiny must at a minimum provide
the types of protections for individuals affected by agency ac-
tion provided in the Administrative Procedure Act.49 Of course,
since this is by definition a criminal, rather than a civil arena,
even those protections may be constitutionally inadequate.
I. THE GREATEST DANGER OF ALL
So far the discussion has limited itself to the independent
counsel as seen through either of two alternative lenses: either
as an agent of Congress or as an independent agency exercis-
ing executive functions. Either of these modes of analogy
seems adequate for consideration of the various constitutional
issues that arise, and either could, in theory, provide a model
for the development of a constitutional independent counsel
scheme, assuming that the mandatory features of either model
would not render the scheme useless or otherwise politically
undesirable or infeasible. The essence of the argument is that
the features of the scheme determine its constitutional 'home"
and that that "home," in turn, determines the constitutional
limitations on the powers conferred.
The worst case, however, arises when the two models, ab-
solutely separate as a matter of constitutional theory, are
49. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
1282 [Vol. 83:1269
UNITED STATES V. NIXON
blended into one. Thus, for example, Congress might attempt
to retain the control and flexibility that the legislative agency
model offers, and combine that with the vast set of prosecuto-
rial and investigative powers that are afforded executive or in-
dependent agencies. This may be tempting to a legislature
that sees itself as some sort of enforcer of moral or legal con-
straints on members of other branches, but it is clearly incon-
sistent with the separation of powers. Congress, like any other
constitutional actor, must accept the limitations that constrain
each model. Thus, there could be no congressionally controlled
impeachment office whose job it is to prosecute criminal laws
under the direction of and for the benefit of Congress. It would
be a violation of the separation of powers for Congress to create
an independent agency exercising executive powers and then
use it as its own agent for impeachment purposes. This would
subvert the essential checks on Congress as lawmaker, which
prevent it from also being a law enforcer, by clothing an agent
in executive garb. Otherwise all the protections that the Su-
preme Court has insisted upon in Chadha, Bowsher and the
agency cases could be circumvented.
Anyone familiar with the current independent counsel
scheme, and the uses to which it has been put as the papers in
this Symposium go to press, must necessarily pause to wonder
or perhaps worry that these lines of structural protection may
indeed have been transgressed. As Professor Kelley suggests
in a footnote,50 there is a non-trivial issue presented by the
statute whether its requirement that the executive officer, the
independent counsel, provide the House with the fruits of law-
enforcement activity for use in impeachment proceedings is
consistent with the constitutional separation of powers. Far
more than the question whether the statute takes away too
much executive power from the President, far more than the
question whether there is any amount of executive power that
is not too much, this question, in my view, raises extremely se-
rious questions of constitutional validity. Have the structural
limitations on the two branches-including, but not limited to,
the President's control of the execution of laws-been compro-
mised such that the values of individual liberty are threat-
ened? Certainly Professor Kelley's work establishes the por-
tion of the inquiry involving the President's control and the
50. See William K. Kelley, The Constitutional Dilemma of Litigation Un-




integrity of the executive branch as a whole. A similar in-
sider's perspective on the effects on the targets of independent
counsel inquiries over the past twenty years would, I trust, be
equally damning to the individual rights component of the
analysis.51
In short, there is no jurisprudential reason for the Court to
have relegated the nation to the wheel of fortune in hoping that
the occupants of the Office of the Independent Counsel and thejudges who supposedly supervise them would operate in good
faith, exercise self-restraint, and check the temptations that
power and partisanship inevitably dangle before them. It in-
stead could have thought about this statutory creature under
either of two existing models. These models could illuminate
the relevant considerations and provide guidance in under-
standing the statute, despite its novel attributes. Indeed, be-
cause these two models are at their core efforts to acknowledge
the relationship between structural integrity and individual
rights, they are responsive to the very concerns that underlie
the constitutional issues that the independent counsel scheme
raises.
51. Even the facts known about the ordeal of Theodore Olson, the target
of the probe that launched the Morrison case, should have given the SupremeCourt pause to worry about this tremendously important aspect of the analy-
sis. See Case Dropped, Theodore B. Olson, TIME, Sept. 5, 1988, at 84 (detail-ing a 28-month-long ordeal culminating in the unexplained dropping of
charges against Theodore Olson).
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